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PUBLIC SECTOR INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN
CANADA: DOES IT THREATEN OR SUSTAIN
DEMOCRACY?
Mark Thompsont and Sara Slinntt
INTRODUCTION

Public sector industrial relations inevitably involve the intersection of
public policy and the conditions of employment of persons employed in the
public agency. Does the interplay of conflicting interests limit democracy,
or does it provide for the exercise of democratic rights by citizens whose
direct participation in the formulation of public policy may be limited? An
examination of the structures of public sector industrial relations, the
parties' experience with the procedures of industrial relations and the
consequences of labor-management relations may answer this question.
This Article provides a brief introduction to the background (Part I),
legislative framework (Part II), structure of collective bargaining (Part III),
and restrictions on labor relations (Part IV) in Canada's public sector,
focusing on key subsectors. Part V addresses the mechanisms used by
governments to maintain control over public sector labor relations. Direct
government intervention into collective bargaining through wage control
legislation, wage control policies, and ad hoc back to work legislation and
emergency no-strike legislation are important elements of the system.
Part VI discusses the effect on selected public policies, specifically,
public-private compensation differentials, the effect of wage control efforts,
and privatization, are examined.
I.

BACKGROUND

Canada is a mixed economy, with a traditionally robust public sector
providing basic services and supporting a market economy. Beginning in
the 1980s, governments have intermittently attempted to restrain the growth
of the public sector or reduce its absolute size. By the mid-2000s, the
public sector accounted for about 40% of the total economy and 22% of
t Sauder School of Business. University of British Columbia.
tt Osgoode Hall Law School. York University.
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total employment, levels that put Canada in the mid-range of developed
nations.' In addition to basic government services, these data include
virtually all of the education and health sectors, as well as government
enterprises. (In this Article, government enterprises, such as electric
utilities, postal service, etc. are excluded.)
Collective bargaining became an important institution in the Canadian
public sector in the 1960s with the passage of comprehensive labor statutes
in Saskatchewan, Quebec and by the federal government. By the mid1970s, all provinces had enacted similar legislation. Public sector unions,
however, predated these legal changes. Prior to gaining positive collective
bargaining rights they had relied on consultation, lobbying, and other
limited forms of political action to advance the interests of their members.
After enabling legislation was passed, public sector unionism and
collective bargaining grew rapidly. Currently, the public sector is the most
unionized segment of the Canadian economy. Union density is about 70%
overall, ranging from 60% in local government to 75% in health and social
services. National unions exist for local, federal, and provincial employees,
and these are among the largest unions in the country.2
Although collective agreement negotiation and administration remain
public sector union's principal activity, elected officials' budget decisions
and efforts to reduce the size of the public sector draw unions into political
action. Union actions at the senior levels of government (federal and
provincial) is limited to lobbying and advertising, a function of the
parliamentary system of government, while in municipal elections, unions
frequently endorse candidates and contribute campaign funds. At various
times, teachers' and nurses' unions have been especially politically active at
the provincial level.3 However, no data exist on the effectiveness of these
efforts. Some public sector unions affiliate with political parties, in
particular the New Democratic Party (NDP), a historically pro-labor social
democratic party.

1. Mark Thompson & P. Jalette, Public-Sector Collective Bargaining, in CANADIAN LABOUR
AND EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS 403, 403-29 (Morley Gunderson & Daphne Taras eds., 6th ed. 2009).
2. Id. at 409-10.
3. See generally Y. RESHEF & S. RASTIN, UNIONS IN THE TIME OF REVOLUTION: GOVERNMENT
RESTRUCTURING IN ALBERTA AND ONTARIO (2003); see also DYNAMIC NEGOTIATIONS: TEACHER
LABOUR RELATIONS IN CANADIAN ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION (S. Slinn & A.

Sweetman eds., 2012) (explaining the primary and secondary education sub-sector). Public sector unions
have contested provincial legislation restricting election advertising and contributions. See British
Columbia Teachers' Federation v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2009] B.C.S.C. 436; British
Columbia Teachers' Federation v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2009] B.C.S.C. 440; af'd
British Columbia Teachers' Federation v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2011] B.C.C.A. 408;
See also Rod Mickleburgh, Court quashes $3.2Mfine levied by Elections BC against BCGEU, THE
GLOBE AND MAIL, Sept. 7, 2010, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/courtquashes-32m-fine-levied-by-elections-bc-against-bcgeu/article4528969/.
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Traditionally, the NDP was a third party federally, although it attained
the status of official opposition in the 2011 national election. The NDP also
has governed in five provinces. A pro-labor party has governed in Quebec
and regained power in 2012. The advantages of political affiliation
provincially to public sector unions are not obvious. At times the NDP has
enacted harsh restrictions on public sector bargaining when it has governed,
and the pro-labor party in Quebec generally followed the pattern in dealing
with labor issues set by their more conservative opponents. However, the
NDP supports a strong public sector and has never embraced neoliberal
policies aimed at shrinking the size of the state.
II.

LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK

A. ConstitutionalEnvironment
The Canadian Constitution grants the ten provinces exclusive
jurisdiction over labor policies for most industries and about 90% of the
workforce.' Consequently, the federal government has authority over labor
relations only in specified industries, and in relation to its own employees
and those of federal Crown corporations, with the majority of industries and
employees falling under provincial jurisdiction.5
The Constitution's Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter)
protects certain fundamental rights and freedoms from restriction by state
action, i.e., all levels of government.6 For three decades before the
Supreme Court of Canada's (SCC) Health Services decision in 2007, the
freedom of association (FOA) guaranteed by § 2(d) of the Charter was
interpreted by a "Trilogy" of cases as excluding any protection for
collective bargaining or strike activity.' The Health Services decision,
however, expressly overturned that line of jurisprudence, with the majority
redefining the FOA as including a right to the process of collective

4. Pursuant to the property and civil rights power under § 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, ch.1 I (U.K.). Canada's three territorial governments
(Yukon, Northwest Territories, and Nunavut) currently adopt other jurisdictions' employment relations
legislation although they hold delegated jurisdiction over employment relations. Therefore, this Article
addresses only provincial and federal labor legislation.
5. Federally regulated industries include: aeronautics, air transport and airports, atomic energy,
banking, customs, grain elevators, inter-provincial transportation, most railways, postal services,
shipping and navigation, telecommunications, and television and radio broadcasting.
6. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act, 1982, ch. 11, § I (U.K.).
7. The "Trilogy" includes Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act, [1987] 1 S.C.R.
313 (Can.); Public Services Alliance of Canada v. Canada, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424 (Can.); RWDSU v.
Saskatchewan, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460 (Can.). Soon after the Trilogy was affirmed by Professional
Institute of the Public Service of Canada v. Northwest Territories (Commissioner), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 367
(Can.).
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bargaining, including good faith bargaining and consultation.' Nonetheless,
the majority emphasized that it is a highly qualified right protecting only a
general process of collective bargaining rather than a particular labor
relations model and that does not guarantee bargaining outcomes.' The
SCC Fraser decision of April 2011 both affirmed Health Services and
established firm limits on the application of Charter FOA protection for
collective bargaining.'o The scope and effect of application of the FOA to
collective bargaining continues to develop through large volume of case law
on this issue that is currently before the courts. As discussed later in this
Article, this new Constitutional environment caused governments to
reconsider their approaches to regulating and intervening in public sector
labor relations.
B. Different Legislative Approaches
Canadian jurisdictions have enacted an array of legislative approaches
to regulating public sector labor relations. Each province is free to regulate
the conduct of public sector industrial relations within its jurisdiction,
subject to the overriding provisions of the Charter. Consequently, statutory
regulation and organization of public sector labor relations vary
considerably across jurisdictions, even in the regulation of the same sector.
Nonetheless, a general model of labor relations legislation has
developed. The basic elements include workers' right to choose to join a
union and engage in collective bargaining. Negotiations can encompass a
wide variety of subjects (though more limited than private sector
bargaining); unions in most bargaining units can strike, and employers can
lockout workers. Collective agreements regulate the workplace in detail.
Enforcement of these agreements is through private arbitration. A separate
administrative agency (commonly called a "labor relations board")
regulates the system.
1. Federal
As noted above, the federal government passed a comprehensive law
establishing a collective bargaining regime, the Public Service Staff
Relations Act (PSSRA), in the 1960s, which stimulated growth in unionism
and collective bargaining across the country." In many ways the PSSRA
mirrored the traditional pattern of Canadian labor legislation. The most
8.
[2007] 2
9.
10.
11.

Health Services & Support - Facilities Subsector Bargaining Ass'n. v. British Columbia,
S.C.R. 391 (Can.) [hereinafter HealthServices].
Id. at paras. 91, 92, 101, 114.
Attorney General of Ont. v. Fraser, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 3 (Can.) [hereinafter Fraser].
Public Service Staff Relations Act, S.C. 1966-67, ch. 72 (Can.).
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innovative feature of the statute was the "choice of procedures," a provision
that gave unions the right to choose to bargain with conciliation and the
right to strike in case of an impasse or to negotiate under a regime of
arbitration. The federal system has evolved, in part, through the actions of
the parties and in other areas through judicial rulings. Currently, bargaining
occurs in a small number of broad units composed of several occupational
groups. Bargaining units whose strikes impose inconvenience on the public
or threaten the health or welfare of the public effectively are denied the
right to strike, but normally have recourse to interest arbitration. Weaker
bargaining units normally choose arbitration.
2. Provincial Governments
At the provincial level public sector labor relations vary substantially
in both the forms of statutory regulation and degree of centralization of
bargaining. First, three general approaches to statutory regulation can be
discerned. These range from simply including public sector workers under
the general collective bargaining legislation applying to the private sector,
to regulating bargaining through special, sub-sector specific legislation, or
to a situation where both the general labor relations legislation and special
legislation apply. The content of this legislation also varies considerably, as
discussed below.
3. Municipal
The pattern for regulation of municipal public workers is similar to
that at the provincial level. Civic and transportation workers usually are
regulated by the general collective bargaining legislation, a practice that has
existed for decades. Meanwhile, municipal firefighters and police tend to
be regulated by special legislation that bans strikes in favor of interest
arbitration.
III. STRUCTURE OF BARGAINING

A. Senior Levels of Government
While Canadian collective bargaining is usually decentralized and
fragmented, bargaining units in senior levels of government tend to be large
and comprehensive. In some cases, centralized bargaining structures are the
result of negotiations to combine smaller units, while in others bargaining
units are established by statute. In the 1980s and 1990s, bargaining
structures in healthcare and education, which are provincially funded, also
became more centralized in most provinces. At the municipal level,
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bargaining is highly decentralized, with smaller bargaining units within
municipal boundaries.
Inevitably, industrial relations issues become part of the political
discourse in provinces where labor is relatively militant, such as Quebec,
Ontario and British Columbia. In the 1980s and 1990s, the ability of
Quebec governments to manage labor conflict was an important electoral
issue. In general, however, electoral results do not turn on labor issues.
The political Right typically urges repressive action against public sector
unions, while the Left or progressive parties advocate more conciliatory
approaches to labor issues. The presence of a pro-labor party in provincial
legislatures moderates the anti-labor positions of conservative parties, even
when a pro-labor party is unlikely to gain power. 12
B. Education

Constitutionally, education at the primary and secondary levels falls
under provincial authority. A variety of statutory regimes govern the labor
relations between the parties. Through the 1980s, reliance on provincial
funding increased, as governments wished to ensure that all pupils had
access to comparable educational services, independent of the tax base of
the locality in which they lived. As the importance of provincial funding
grew, so did provincial influence over bargaining outcomes. By 2010,
these influences produced local bargaining in three provinces (including
two of the larger provinces), provincial structures in three smaller
provinces, and "two-tier" structures in the remaining four provinces.
In five provinces the parties are free to strike or lockout; two have
partial strikes, and strikes are banned at least at the local level in the
remaining five provinces. Despite varying legal regimes, province-wide
strikes by teachers are effectively banned in all provinces, either by
fragmented bargaining structures or political realities.' Nonetheless, local
strikes do occur in the provinces where they are permitted. As the
proportion of working mothers in the population has grown, so has the
political and social significance of any strike that closes schools. Teacher
strikes are major political events, 16% of the back-to-work laws outlined
below applied to schools. Typically, education is included in provincial
wage restraint programs described below.

12. Mark Thompson & Joseph Rose, Regional Differences in Canadian Industrial Relations: Is
there a "Canadian" System?, in BEYOND THE REGIONAL DIVIDE: REGIONAL DIMENSIONS OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 307, 310-11 (Mark Thompson, Joseph Rose & Anthony Smith eds., 2003).
13. Crosscurrents: Comparative Review of Elementary and Secondary Teacher Collective
Bargaining Structures in Canada, in DYNAMIC NEGOTIATIONS:

TEACHER LABOUR RELATIONS IN

CANADIAN ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION 13 (Sara Slinn & Arthur Sweetman eds., 2012).
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C Healthcare

Collective bargaining in the health sector is one of the most
Healthcare is
contentious areas of Canadian industrial relations.
administered by the provinces. Provincial governments fund virtually all
hospital services with assistance from federal grants. No significant private
sector exists for the provision of most healthcare services. As in other
countries, healthcare costs increase faster than prices generally, creating
perpetual funding pressures on governments. Hospital services are labor
intensive, and multiple unions represent workers in the sector. (Physicians
negotiate fee schedules with governments, but these processes are excluded
from this Article.) The results are negotiations under the supervision of
provincial governments involving large proportions of their budgets.
Strikes, or the threats of strikes, raise public concerns and attract legislative
action.
Structures and legislation regulating collective bargaining in the
healthcare sector vary across provinces, but a number of general statements
cover the essential elements of the systems. In hospitals, separate
bargaining units exist for professionals and nonprofessionals. Employers'
associations generally represent management. Government is not the
employer, but it exercises the final authority over costs arising from
collective agreements. Strikes do occur, but are never total. All three legal
regimes exist for strikes, total bans (with interest arbitration), regulated
strikes (with essential services required), and unregulated right to strike
(essential services negotiated) described above. Strikes are not frequent,
but do attract back-to-work legislation-eleven laws passed between 1992
and 2012.'1
D. Municipal Government

In law, municipal governments are corporations and are treated as
equivalent to private corporations in many respects. The permissible scope
of bargaining is broad, but normally does not include basic pensions, which
are set by statute. Although the law does not permit bargaining over
pensions, informal negotiations do occur. Any changes in contributions
must be approved by trustees who normally represent employers,
employees, and the public. Provincial legislation generally regulates
pension plans to ensure their financial viability.

14. L. HAIVEN & J. HAIVEN, THE RIGHT TO STRIKE AND THE PROVISIONS OF EMERGENCY

SERVICES IN CANADIAN HEALTH CARE (2002), www.policyalternatives.ca/publications/reports/right-

strike-and-provision-emergency-services-canadian-health-care.
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Municipal governments in Canada have several characteristics that are
relevant to collective bargaining. City councils depend heavily on the
technical expertise of individual departments and seldom reject staff
recommendations on operational matters. Municipal governments are not
permitted to incur deficits in their operating budgets. The taxation authority
of these governments is limited. Most importantly, they do not levy sales or
income taxes. Thus, their sources of income are property taxes, grants from
provincial governments, and fees.15
Despite these limitations on the authority of local governments, unions
representing their employees are often active politically. Civic politics are
dominated by locally based parties, not affiliated directly with provincial or
national organizations.
Local governments realize the power of labor organizations to
influence bargaining in this environment and have developed various
structures to prevent undue interference over bargaining outcomes.
Industrial relations staff wields the authority common to other municipal
departments.
IV. RESTRICTIONS ON LABOR RELATIONS

Relative to the private sector, public sector labor relations are subject
to significant restrictions
A. Scope of Bargaining
The scope of private sector collective bargaining in Canada is
restricted only by the statutory, common law or constitutional requirement
to bargain in good faith. No topics receive special treatment by law or labor
board rulings. Under Canadian law a duty to bargain in good faith attaches
to all matters. 16 Nonetheless, this duty can be breached where a party takes
to impasse a term that the other party could not reasonably be expected to
accept.' 7
In contrast with the virtually unlimited scope of private sector
negotiations, public sector bargaining legislation commonly removes
certain matters from the scope of bargaining, and this is seen at all levels of
government. Similarly, certain terms and conditions of work are statutorily
15. K. A. Graham, Collective Bargaining in the Municipal Sector, in PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING INCANADA: BEGINNING OF THE END OR END OF THE BEGINNING 180 (Gene Swimmer &
Mark Thompson eds., 1995).
16. Dayco (Canada) Ltd. v. National Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers
Union of Canada (CAW-Canada), [1993] 2 S.C.R 230, para. 63 (Can.); see B. A. Langille & P.
Macklem, Beyond Belief Labour Law's Duty to Bargain, 13 QUEEN'S L.J. 62, 62-102 (1988)
(regarding the inadequacies and dangers of the hard bargaining-surface bargaining distinction).
17. Royal Oak Mines Inc. v. Canada (Labour Relations Board), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 369 (Can.).
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prescribed and, therefore, not negotiable. For example, at the federal level
the Public Service Labour Relations Act (formerly the PSSRA) precludes
bargaining over pensions; classifications; technological change; and, criteria
for promotion, transfer or layoff.' Bargaining by provincial civil servant
tends to be subject to similar restrictions.19
Within the realm of provincial jurisdiction, certain matters are
expressly excluded by statute or regulation from bargaining, and other
matters are prescribed by statute or regulation. For instance, in the primary
and secondary education sector teachers' responsibilities, class size, limits
on instructional and noninstructional days, holidays and vacations, and
pensions are also commonly treated as a matter for government policy and
prescribed by legislation rather than negotiated. 20
The paramilitary
character of police and firefighter employment tends to be associated with
statutory restrictions on bargaining issues such as discipline and superiorsubordinate relations.21
B.

BargainingImpasse and Work Stoppage
1.

Access to Strike

Canadian labor law takes a relatively restrictive approach to strike
activity. First, strikes are lawful in very limited circumstances. 22 For
example, recognition or unfair labor practice strikes are prohibited in all
circumstances as these disputes are resolved by a labor relations board or
similar tribunal. Strikes and lockouts are unlawful unless a collective
agreement has expired, and substantial statutory prerequisites must often be
satisfied. These commonly include exhausting conciliation or mediation
process, a successful strike vote and, in some jurisdictions, statutory
advance notice of a strike.
Second, statutory definitions of "strike" generally contain no purposive
element.23 That is, no requirement exists that the purpose of the activity
must be related to bargaining or to compelling an employer to settle. Strike
activity therefore captures any concerted action disrupting production and,

18. Public Service Labour Relations Act, S.C. 2003, ch. 22, § 2 (Can.).
19. Public-SectorCollective Bargaining,supranote 1, at 415.
20. See, e.g., School Act, RSBC 1996, c. 412, ss. 17, 76.1; B.C. Reg. 114/2002, Sch. 1 and Scb. I
(supplement); Public Sector Pension Plans Act, 1999 S.B.C., ch. 44 (Can. B.C.).
21. Public-SectorCollective Bargaining,supranote 1, at 415-16.
22. Although collective bargaining is now recognized as enjoying some limited protection by the
CharterFOA, the question of whether the FOA extends to protecting the right to strike has not yet been
revisited by the Supreme Court of Canada. The majority in the B.C. Health Services decision
emphasized that it was not addressing the question of strikes.
23. See, e.g., s.1(1) "Strike," Labour Relations Act, 1995 S.O., ch. 1, Sch. A (Can.).
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so, restrictions on strikes often extend to political protests and other
nonbargaining related activity.
Finally, much of the public sector has very limited or no access to
strikes. Three general legislative approaches to regulating public sector
work stoppages exist: (1) the unfettered strike model, under which the
typical preconditions described above apply; (2) the no-strike or
compulsory arbitration model, under which work stoppages are prohibited,
and unresolved disputes must go to interest arbitration; and, (3) the
designation or limited strike model, under which a proportion of workers in
the unit are determined to be essential and therefore required to continue to
provide services during any work stoppage. 24 Where strikes are prohibited,
compulsory interest arbitration is generally substituted and interest
arbitration is commonly-but not always-available in sectors subject to
essential service limits on work stoppages.
The dispute resolution mechanism available to different groups of
public workers in several representative jurisdictions is set out in Table 1.
Table 1: Dispute Resolution in Selected Public Sectors and Jurisdictions 25
Public
Servants

Hospital
Employees

Public School
Teachers

Municipal
Police

, QU

ON TON

Work
stoppage ban
Work
stoppage

Municipal
Firefighters
ON 1, QU

2

FED, ON

permitted

Work stoppage subject
to essential
service limits

BC, ON,
QU

Union may
select strike

FED

BC, ON
(municipal
ambulance
workers),

BC, QU 3

BC

BC

QU
or

FED

arbitration

Notes:
1. Either party can request arbitration once conciliation exhausted.
2. Arbitration available after report of unsuccessful mediation or at either party's request.
3. Work stoppages not permitted for issues negotiated locally.
4. At request of either party Minister may order arbitration if certain conditions met.

24. Adell, Ponak & Grant labeled these categories in reference to approaches to public sector
essential service dispute resolution. However, these three categories equally describe approaches to
dispute resolution across the Canadian public sector.
GRANT, STRIKES INESSENTIAL SERVICES (2001).
25.

BERNARD ADELL, ALLEN PONAK & MICHEL

LABOUR BRANCH, HUMAN RESOURCES AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT CANADA,

Collective

Bargaining Dispute Resolution in the Public and Parapublic Sectors in Canada (Jan. 1, 2006),

http://www.hrsdc.gc.caleng/labour/labourlaw/ind-rel/pub.shtml.
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As is evident from Table 1 (presenting information for four
representative jurisdictions: Federal, BC, Ontario and Quebec), public
servants generally fall within the limited strike model, except for the federal
public service, where the union has the option of choosing whether to strike
or have the dispute resolved by interest arbitration. Hospital employees are
also commonly subject to the limited strike, although once again the federal
unions may opt to strike or go to arbitration, and Ontario hospital workers
fall under the no-strike and compulsory conciliation approach. Municipal
ambulance workers in that province may strike subject to essential service
designations. Public school teachers in some jurisdictions have unrestricted
access to striking (e.g., Federal and Ontario), while those in other provinces
are subject to essential service limits on work stoppages (e.g., British
Columbia and Quebec).
Municipal police and firefighters have the most limited-if anyaccess to the strike mechanism. For instance in Ontario and Quebec, these
workers are banned from striking, while in British Columbia, firefighter and
police strike activity is limited by essential service requirements. 26
2.

Use of Interest Arbitration

As a corollary to the widespread restriction or ban on work stoppages,
mandatory or voluntary interest arbitration is a common feature of Canadian
public sector labor relations and is generally in the form of conventional
arbitration rather than alternatives, such as final offer selection.
Although compulsory arbitration avoids work stoppages, research
demonstrates that it also tends to have some negative consequences:
settlements are delayed, and, rather than being expressed through strikes,
conflict generally reappears in different forms, such as grievances.27 There
is also some evidence that arbitration is associated with a small wage
settlement premium.28
Use of interest arbitration to resolve impasse in public sector
negotiations poses a dilemma for governments, especially at senior levels.
While these governments are often reluctant or unwilling to permit work
26. Fire and Police Services Collective Bargaining Act, 1996 R.S.B.C., ch. 142, ss. 2, 3 (Can.
B.C.); Labour Relations Code, 1996 R.S.B.C., ch. 244 s. 72 (Can.).
27. J. B. Rose, The Complaining Game: How Effective Is Compulsory Interest Arbitration?,23 J.

COLLECTIVE NEGs. 187 (1994) (noting a study involving over 4,000 settlements in Ontario over the
1982 to 1990 period); see also Michele Campolieti, Robert Hebdon & Benjamin Dachis, Collective
Bargaining in the Public Sector: New Directions (Working Paper, 2012)
28. See, e.g., M. Gunderson & D. Hyatt, Canadian Public Sector Employment Relations in
Transition, in PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT INATIME OF TRANSITION 1, 1-20 (Dale Belman et al. eds.,

1996). Note that a more recent study using data from a longer time period (1978-2008) finds no wage
premium, but suggests that the wage control legislation of the 1990s may be responsible for this finding.
Campolieti et al., supra note 27.
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stoppages in sectors such as health or education, they are also distrustful of
intervention by an independent third party arbitrator and unwilling to
relinquish control over what may be a very costly collective settlement.
One response has been for governments to impose legislative limits on the
range of settlements in bargaining, which are set out below. Another
strategy has been to statutorily restrain interest arbitrators' discretion by
requiring awards to take account of such factors as the public sector
employer's "ability to pay," and the effect of the award on service levels if
funding and taxes are not increased. 29 This approach is criticized for
intruding on arbitrators' independence and evidence suggests that
arbitrators resist limiting awards based on this criterion.3 0
3. Essential Services
Governments' discomfort with strikes has also prompted them to
restrict work stoppage activity short of imposing a ban by legislating
essential service limits. This approach is common in the health sector and
public service.3 1 Essential service designation legislation tends to require
parties to reach an agreement, in advance of collective agreement expiry, on
the level of service that will continue to be provided in event of a strike or a
lockout. Where parties cannot agree, the labor relations board issues an
essential services order. Although the essential services designation model
is common in some sectors, this approach has also been introduced in an ad
hoc manner in response to frustration over specific disputes or longstanding labor relations disruption in a sector.
A key concern with this model is that the service levels agreed to or
imposed may be such that any work stoppage is rendered ineffective,
leading to a protracted dispute. 32 A further concern is the effect a limited
strike will have on bargaining power and outcomes of negotiations. A
recent study employing data for all public sector negotiations involving 500
or more employees, occurring between 1976 and 2006, considered the
effect on wage settlements of the presence of the essential service
designation model in the sector during the initial year of a wage settlement.
The study concludes that it is associated with higher annual average wage
29. See, e.g., Schedule Q of the Savings and Restructuring Act, 1996 S.O. 1996, ch. I (Can. Ont.)
amending the Hospital Labour Disputes Arbitration Act, 1990 R.S.O., ch. H. 14 (Can. Ont.) to require
arbitrators in the compulsory arbitration system to consider the following criteria when reaching their
decision or award, and additional criteria were added subsequently. Public Sector Dispute Resolution
Act, 1997 S.O., ch. 21, Sch. A, s. 1 (Can. Ont.).
30. See, e.g., Jeffrey Sack, Ability to Pay in the Public Sector: A CriticalAppraisal,LABOUR ARB.
YEARBOOK 277, 279 (1991).
3 1. See supra Tab. 1.
32. See discussion of this issue in BCPSEA v. BCTF, BCLRB No. B236/201 1, B214/201 1, and
BCLRB No. B132/2011.
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increases, ranging from 0.28 to 0.41 percentage points, and with increases
up to 0.8% in the average hourly wage.3 3 Similarly, another recent study
found that, compared to full access to strikes, the essential service model is
associated with reduced wages. 34
V.

DIRECT GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

The early years of collective bargaining occurred during periods of
high inflation. In addition, public sector wages had fallen behind the
private sector in many areas. These factors combined to produce a
relatively high number of strikes and generous settlements. This period
also saw the entrenchment of wage control legislation, back-to-work
legislation, or invoking existing emergency provisions suspending the right
to strike or lockout as routine tools for senior governments to control public
sector bargaining and its outcomes.
A. Wage ControlLegislation
Public sector wage control legislation has become a commonly applied
tool for governments. The first post-World War II wage control legislation
was introduced in 1975. Waves of public sector wage restraint legislation
were passed by senior governments in the mid-1970s, the 1980s, and 1990s.
The 2008 financial crisis has prompted Canadian governments to, once
again, impose statutory restrictions on wage settlements of public
workers.3 5
Initially, governments justified wage controls by the need to restrain
inflation. During the 1980s, however, a number of provinces rationalized
wage restraint as a part of necessary, extensive public service restructuring.
These policies provoked protests by labor and legislation to suppress strikes
and protests. Over time, the appeal of government restructuring waned,
33. Benjamin Dachis, No Free Ride: The Cost of Essential Services Designation (Sept. I1, 2008),
http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/ebrief_62.pdf.
34. Campolieti et al., supra note 27.
35. For instance, the Federal government has employed this type of legislation four times since the
1970s : (1) The Anti-Inflation Act, 1974-75-76, ch. 75 (Can.), in force from 1975 to 1978, technically
restrained wages and prices in both public and private sectors and in both federal and provincially
regulated industries in order to curb inflation, but was really only applied to the public sector; (2) The
Public Sector Compensation Restraint Act, S.C. 1980-81-82-83, ch. 122 (Can.) limited all forms of
compensation for federal public service workers and extended existing agreements for two years,
effectively preventing bargaining or work stoppages for two years. A Charterchallenge failed, and the
SCC's decision formed one of the Trilogy decisions; (3) The Public Sector Compensation Act, 1991
S.C., ch. 30 (Can.) imposed what was ultimately a five-year extension of collective agreements and
compensation plans, prohibited any form of compensation increase; (4) The Expenditure Restraint Act,
2009 S.C., ch. 2 (Can.) [hereinafter ERA] limited compensation for a broad group of public sector
workers.
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although governments did shrink in size. Gradually, governments
abandoned statutory controls in favor of controlling compensation through
budgets.
The 2008 financial crisis has prompted Canadian governments to once
again turn their minds to statutorily restricting public sector compensation.
The most recent effort is the ExpenditureRestraintAct (ERA) in force since
March 2009. It limits compensation for a broad group of federal public
sector workers.36 The ERA is the first federal public sector wage restraint
legislation passed since the Health Services decision and is the subject of
several currently ongoing legal challenges contending that such unilateral
determination of compensation is an unjustifiable violation of the Charterprotected FOA." Currently, it is not certain how much of a restriction the
newly defined Charter FOA will be on governments' ability to employ
wage control legislation and whether this remains a readily available tool
for Canadian governments to resort to constrain public sector collective
bargaining.
B. Wage RestraintPolicies

As a less intrusive alternative to wage control legislation, senior
governments have invoked wage restraint policies. By the beginning of
2000, governments had developed a pattern of announcing an acceptable
limit for compensation increases and then binding public sector employer
bargaining agents to that figure.38 This system is sustained by frequent
back-to-work legislation (discussed below). The effects of the back-towork legislation and nonstatutory controls have been profound. Unions
realize that the alternative to accepting offers based on the announced
guidelines is likely to be a legislated settlement.39 Labor has resisted with

36. ERA, supra note 35.
37. See, e.g., Canada (Royal Canadian Mounted Police) v. Canada (Attorney General), [2011]
CanLII 735 (Can.), leave to appeal to Supreme Court of Canada granted 20 December 2012 [hereinafter
RCMP v. Canada]; Federal Government Dockyard Trades and Labour Council v. The Attorney General,
[2011] Can. LII 1210 (Can.) [hereinafter Dockyards v. Attorney General]; Association of Justice
Counsel v. Canada (Attorney General), [2011] Can. LII 6435 (Can.) [hereinafter ACJ v. Canada];
overturned by Association of Justice Counsel v. Attorney General of Canada, [2012] ONCA 530 (Can.).
38. Another, nonstatutory approach governments some provincial governments (Ontario and
British Columbia) have adopted to curb public sector wage costs is to publicly disclose public sector
salaries. However, researchers have found that simple disclosure is unlikely to be effective and may
have an unintended, inflationary effect. R. Gomez & S. Wald, When Public Sector SalariesBecome
Public Knowledge: Academic Salaries and Ontario'sPublic Sector Salary Disclosure Act, 53 CAN.
PUB. ADM. 107, 117 (2010).
39. See, e.g., the recent experience of primary and secondary school teachers in Ontario. The
provincial government announced its expectation for zero compensation increases for two year. Finding
most teachers' unions unwilling to agree, the government promptly passed legislation prohibiting strikes
and imposing a default collective agreement incorporating the compensation limit, if parties were unable
to settle acceptable collective agreements within a specified deadline. The legislation also granted
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demonstrations, illegal strikes and other forms of job action. Generally, the
immediate results of labor resistance were failures. However, these efforts
appear to have imposed political costs on governments, discouraging
legislation in favor of less formal controls.
C. Back-to-Work andEmergency No-Strike Legislation
Direct government intervention to curtail labor disputes, through ad
hoc legislation or exercising emergency provisions in existing legislation, is
another long-standing feature of labor relations in Canada. Though these
tools are also occasionally used in private sector bargaining disputes, they
are more commonly employed against public sector workers.
In these instances governments end a work stoppage by means of
back-to-work legislation that typically orders employees to resume work
and employers to permit employees to resume work, and imposes interest
arbitration (sometimes with limits on arbitrators' discretion on monetary
elements of the award), or extends an expired collective agreement or a
modified version of the expired agreement.
Between 1982 and April of 2012, Canadian governments, federal and
provincial, enacted a total of 144 laws ending strikes or imposing collective
agreement provisions on the parties in public sector disputes. These laws
cover all levels of government, including municipal workers, as well as the
education and health sectors. Historically, back-to-work legislation referred
unresolved issues to arbitration for final resolution. By the 1990s, the
majority of laws imposed a settlement, usually the employer's last offer, on
the unionized workers. 40 A recent study concluded that use of back-towork legislation is associated with reduced wage settlements, and this effect
continues into future rounds and is greater for higher wages.41
At various times, several jurisdictions have also had the power to
suspend the right to strike or lock-out, pursuant to emergency provisions in
their labor legislation. These mechanisms are very rarely used, although the
Federal government has utilized the Ministerial Referral power repeatedly
in the last year to end work stoppages: in one case in the public sector and
the other in a private sector dispute. 42
Such interventions are way around creating an effective, functioning
labor relations system, yet have virtually become the norm for public sector
disputes in some jurisdictions and sectors. This is all the more striking
Cabinet power to unilaterally amend collective agreements. Putting Students First Act, 2012 S.O., ch.
11.
40.

CANADIAN FOUNDATION FOR LABouR RIGHTS, RESTRICTIVE LABOUR LAWS DIRECTORY,

www.labourrights.ca/restrictive-labour-laws (last visited Dec. 14, 2012).
41. Campolieti et al., supranote 27.
42. CanadaLabour Code, R.S.C., ch. L 2, s. 87.4 (1985).
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given the context: work stoppages are at relatively low rates, and Canada
has experienced a long-running substantial decline dating from the mid1970s in number of work stoppages and number of person days lost to work
stoppages.4 3
Table 2: Public Sector Work Stoppages 1980-2012, Annual Averages"
Number of Work

Public Sector

Person days

Public Sector

Stoppage

Percent of Total

lost

Percent of Total

1980-89

120

19.1

1,533,000

27.6

1990-99

88

22.4

789,000

30.6

2000-12

56

21.2

759,000

34.7

Against these general trends, there have been some exceptional,
discrete disputes that have contributed to short-lived high levels of strike
activity. Declines in work stoppages have been more rapid in the private
sector; consequently, public sector disputes represent an increasing
proportion of strike activity. 45 As some commentators point out, this is
occurring at the same time as public sector workers face greater restrictions
on striking.46
VI.

IMPACT ON PUBLIC POLICY

Perhaps the most salient criticism of collective bargaining in the public
sector is that the system enables unions to distort democracy when they can
combine political and economic pressures on employers. Verification of
this assertion is difficult given the complexity of political decisions and
public policy formulation. Nonetheless, data are available on several
categories of public policies in Canada.
A. Compensation: Public-PrivateSector Comparisons
Comparisons of public sector compensation with the private sector are
a continuing issue in public sector industrial relations. Private sector
employer organizations frequently complain that public sector employees
receive higher pay than their private sector counterparts, thereby creating

43. HARVEY J. KRAHN, GRAHAM S. LOWE & KAREN D. HUGHES, WORK, INDUSTRY & CANADIAN

SOCIETY 391 (5th ed. 2007).
44. Based on data supplied by WORKPLACE INFORMATION DIRECTORATE, HUMAN RESOURCES
AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN CANADA, Thompson & Jalatte, supra note 1, at 419.

45. M. Gunderson, B. Hebdon & D. Hyatt, Strikes and Dispute Resolution, in CANADIAN. LABOUR
AND EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS 339, 343 (Morley Gunderson & Daphne Taras eds., 6th ed. 2009).
46. KRAHN, supra note 43, at 91.
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labor market pressures for the private sector.4 7 Although Canadian
governments have regularly resorted to wage control legislation (as
discussed above) evidence suggests that it does not substantially affect
public compensation costs nor does it significantly constrain private sector
wage inflation. 48
Public sector unions attack these assertions on
methodological grounds. 49
Broad comparisons of public and private sector compensation usually
are misleading.
Difficulties in comparing the two groups include
establishing appropriate comparators in the private sector, accounting for
union premiums in the highly unionized public sector and calculating total
compensation given that benefits and deferred compensation are more
significant in the public sector.50 The most accurate comparisons rely on
human capital models, but these studies are difficult and expensive to
conduct.
In fact, the scholarly literature on the subject in Canada is slight and
dated. Nonetheless, studies based on data from the mid-1990s found a
"pure government pay premium" of about 5 to 10%, though this differential
is not constant across types of workers or across the sector.
It is greater
for women and low-wage workers (and may be negative at the highest end
of the wage scale). The public sector advantage to women is attributed to
political pressure on employers to avoid replicating the results of
discrimination against women or other vulnerable groups in the private
sector.52 Although the differences in the premium among levels of
government are not great, to the extent that the difference exists it may be
greater in local and provincial compared to federal government.53 There
appears to be no significant public sector premium in education or health
sectors, two sectors accounting for the great majority of overall provincial
budgets. 54
Another means of comparing compensation is by comparing collective
bargaining settlements in the two sectors. Gunderson's study of aggregate
wage changes for the public and private sectors for the 1978-2007 period

47. See Canadian Federation of Independent Business, Wage Watch: A Comparison of PublicSector and Private-Sector Wages, Dec. 2008, http://www.cfib-fcei.ca/cfib-documents/rr3077.pdf.
48. See, e.g., D. A.L. Auld & D. A. Wilton, The Impact of Public Sector Wage Controls in
Ontario, 42 REL. INDUS. 132, 148 (1987). Similarly, Gunderson finds no evidence of long-run public to
private sector wage spillovers. M. Gunderson, Compensation in the Public Sector, in THE HANDBOOK
OF CANADIAN PUBLiC ADMINISTRATION 203 (Christopher Dunn ed., 2d ed. 2010).

49. Canadian Union of Public Employees, Battle of the Wages: Who Gets Paid More, Public or
PrivateSector Workers? (Dec. 2011) http://cupe.caleconomics/battle-wages-paid-more-public-private.
50. Gunderson, supranote 48.
51. Id. at 208-09.
52. Id at 208.
53. Id
54. Id
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found little evidence of an overall substantial difference between them, with
a slight advantage to the private sector, despite volatility in public sector
compensation settlements.5 5
B. Privatization

During the 1980s and 1990s, all levels of government in Canada
examined the possibilities of privatizing government operations. Virtually
without exception, public sector unions opposed these initiatives, using
political pressure, litigation and collective bargaining to resist government
initiatives.
In broad terms, labor was seldom successful in blocking privatization
when a senior level of government was focused on the objective. Federally,
the government privatized the national airline, a railroad, an aircraft
manufacturer and a large petroleum company. Provincial governments sold
a major mining company, telephone service providers, a gas utility, a liquor
distribution system, etc., in addition to contracting out highway
maintenance and other functions. The postal service contracted out
virtually all of its retail facilities. A few municipalities contracted out
services, especially solid waste disposal.56
Perhaps the notable example of the impact of privatization in the
twenty-first century was the contracting out of all hospital work in British
Columbia that did not involve patient care in 2002. Thousands of workers
were affected. Wages fell by 30%, and healthcare unions challenged the
government's actions in court. The outcome was the B. C. Health Services
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada." The settlement agreements
arising from that decision included the requirement that the government
repeal that impugned legislation, and monetary compensation. In one
agreement, covering facilities bargaining, the $75 million paid in
compensation included $68 million in payments to individual workers
negatively affected by the unconstitutional legislation. Presumably, that
decision has made other provinces more cautious about large-scale
contracting out of unionized functions without consultation or negotiation.
By the turn of the twenty-first century, the push for privatization had
waned. After disposing of major public enterprises, the rewards of
privatization seemed less appealing. The current federal government has
announced that it wishes to sell atomic energy and research facilities,
55. Id. at 209-12.
56. Mark Thompson, The industrial Relations Effects of Privatization: Evidence from Canada
Collective Bargaining in the Municipal Sector, in PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN

CANADA: BEGINNING OF THE END OR END OF THE BEGINNING 180, 164-79 (Gene Swimmer & Mark
Thompson eds., 1995).
57. Health Services, supra note 8.
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although the number of potential buyers is limited.
Since 2000,
governments have preferred so called "P3" projects, public, private
partnerships. Again, public sector unions have opposed these policies.
These arrangements, the terms of which are not available to the public,
usually involve private firms constructing infrastructure projects with a
long-term contract with the government to operate them. The federal
government provides modest subsidies for some of these projects. For
some projects, such as hospitals or airports, the operational contracts
involve no change in government functions. That is, health authorities
continued to operate the facility as before. Private firms are available to
operate water and sewage systems, but the number of such arrangements is
limited.
Overall, the gains from P3 projects have been difficult to measure, in
part, because of the secrecy surrounding them. Some conservative
governments continue to espouse P3 projects, but the pace of their adoption
appears to have slowed. Nonetheless, the privatization that has occurred,
and the threat of further privatization, has been an effective threat for
muting public sector bargaining power and opposition, particularly in
periods of austerity.
CONCLUSION

We return now to the question posed in the title of this Articlewhether public sector industrial relations threaten or sustain democracy in
Canada. This question was inspired by Wellington and Winters' 1969
article assessing municipal bargaining in the United States.5 8 Those
authors' thesis was that public sector labor relations threatened democracy
because the irresistible strength of these unions in bargaining resulted in
elected governments settling agreements contrary to the mandate from, and
best interests of, the electorate. This Article's survey of the Canadian
experience suggests there is little evidence that such a phenomenon exists in
public sector labor relations in this country, or that public sector bargaining
threatens democracy.
In general, Canadian governments have accepted the basic structures
of industrial relations systems in a democratic society. However, they have
not accepted the outcomes of bargaining and utilize an array of legislative
and policy tools to control the parties' behaviors and bargaining outcomes.
Available evidence shows that those results have not caused distortion of
labor markets or government spending.

58. Ralph K. Winter & Harry H. Wellington, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public
Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107 (1969).
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Canada's Supreme Court has spoken in strong terms of the value of
collective bargaining, directly linking it to the array of values underlying
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and specifically linking it to enhancing
democracy. 9 The Court clearly regards workplace democracy as valuable
as other forms of democracy, and a value that is inherent in the Charter.
The majority of the Court in Health Services, a decision striking down
government interference with public sector collective bargaining rights,
stated:
Human dignity, equality, liberty, respect for the autonomy of the
person and the enhancement of democracy are among the values that
underlie the Charter . . . . All of these values are complemented and

indeed, promoted, by the protection of collective bargaining in § s.2(d)
of the Charter.

The right to bargain collectively with an employer enhances the
human dignity, liberty and autonomy of workers by giving them the
opportunity to influence the establishment of workplace rules and
thereby gain some control over a major aspect of their lives namely
work.
Finally, a constitutional right to collective bargaining is supported by
the Charter value of enhancing democracy. Collective bargaining
permits workers to achieve a form of workplace democracy and to
ensure the rule of law in the workplace.
We conclude that the protection of collective bargaining under s.2(d)
of the Charteris consistent with and supportive of the values underlying
the Charterand the purposes of the Charter as a whole. Recognizing
that workers have the right to bargain collectively as part of their
freedom to associate reaffirms the values of dignity, personal autonomy,
equality and democracy that are inherent in the Charter. 60
Clearly, public sector collective bargaining promotes workplace
democracy, and in Canada our Charter appears to recognize that as a form
of democracy worthy of constitutional protection.
In addition, collective bargaining introduces elements of transparency
in human resource decisions in the public sector. The legalistic nature of
the process in Canada limits the abilities of employers, interest groups and
even unions to shape decisions without at least some public scrutiny.
Our review of the experiences and evidence of public sector industrial
relations and bargaining outcomes suggest that although public sector
workers are often targeted as either the cause or a convenient solution for
governments' problems, these perceptions are not grounded on strong
59. Health Services, supra note 8 at paras. 81, 82-86.
60. Id. at paras. 81-82, 85-86.
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evidence. Therefore, government interference in public sector collective
bargaining is founded on shaky ground. Rather than protecting democracy,
such government efforts may, themselves, be threatening Canadian
democracy.
The model of public sector industrial relations we have presented has
been the norm for over fifteen years. A tense equilibrium between the
parties prevails. Governments' large stick and small carrot has proven
effective in restraining collective bargaining, subject to the constraints
imposed by the courts. By early 2013, prospects for fundamental change
were not evident. However, Canadian industrial relations is subject to
influences from other English-speaking countries. At various times, rightwing governments in the United States, the United Kingdom, New Zealand,
and Australia have influenced Canadian politicians and business leaders. If
a politician such as Ronald Reagan, Margaret , or Roger Douglas (from
New Zealand) appears to challenge collective bargaining in his or her own
country, the status quo in Canada may be threatened. Corporate interests
funding attacks on public sector industrial relations in U.S. states are
important members of the Canadian business community. They could
import the principles of deunionization of the public sector if the political
climate becomes favorable. However, the decentralized Canadian industrial
relations system impedes major changes nationally.
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